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This essay in honour of Michael Bogdan – who is as far from an authoritarian 
personality or a totalitarian thinker as a professor of law can conceivably be – is 
intended as a historical sketch. It does not treat in detail every type of totalitarian 
state; much more space than that allocated to this essay, and a writer with much 
wider knowledge, would be required for that kind of encyclopaedic exercise. In 
particular, all the states considered in this essay are European states; it was not 
possible to consider totalitarianism in Asia, which clearly is a relevant limitation. 
Despite these qualifications, it is hoped that a review of the situation of societies 
under totalitarian rule might throw light, from an unusual angle, on the rela-
tionship (or the absence of a relationship) between the nature of a society and 
the private international rules adopted by its legislature or courts.
1.   The criterion of totalitarianism
There is one preliminary difficulty in even starting to write about something as 
inconsequential (compared to the totalitarian phenomenon as a whole) as the 
private international law rules adopted in totalitarian states. That is the notorious 
absence of consensus, in political science, about what are the exact characteristics 
of totalitarian states, as opposed to merely authoritarian or dictatorial ones.
The absence of consensus is unsurprising. At least since the end of the 
Second World War, no state will proudly proclaim itself totalitarian,1 and the 
1 This was different for Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. See the section “Dottrina,” signed by 
Benito Mussolini (although said to have been at least partially ghost-written for him by Giovanni 
Gentile) within the article “Fascimo” (“Fascismo. – Movimento politico italiano creato da Benito 
Mussolini (v.)”) of the Encicopledia italiana, vol. XIV (1932), p. 848: “per il fascista, tutto è nello 
stato, e nulla di umano o spirituale esiste, e tanto meno ha valore, fuori dello stato. In tal senso il 
fascismo è totalitario,” etc. Similarly in Germany, after Hitler’s rise to power: see in legal literature, 
by eminent specialists of public law, Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie, preface to the new edition of 
November 1933: “Inzwischen haben wir das Politische als das Totale erkannt,” or before that in Der 
Begriff des Politischen, 1932 [8th ed., 2009, p. 23], or his aptly titled article “Totaler Feind, totaler 
Krieg, totaler Staat” in Positionen und Begriffe: im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles, 1939, p. 240 
(3rd ed. 1994, p. 268), with further references; also Ernst Forsthoff, Der totale Staat, 1933. Forsthoff 
recanted after the War, Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft, 1971, p. 54 and note 1.
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characterisation of a state as totalitarian bears with it a considerable stigma. 
It can be used as an instrument of political propaganda, and will be readily 
used by opponents of a state, with hesitation by neutral observers, and not 
at all by supporters. In fact, there is only one state that everyone agrees was 
totalitarian: Nazi Germany. For all others, there is at least a discussion. There 
is doubt about Fascist Italy: its proclaimed ambitions were totalitarian, but 
the historical reality may well have been different; thus according to Hannah 
Arendt, “Mussolini, who was so fond of the term ‘totalitarian state,’ did not 
attempt to establish a full-fledged totalitarian regime and contented himself 
with dictatorship and one-party rule”.2 As for the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European allies, apart from writers refusing on political grounds to characterise 
even the worst Stalinist period as totalitarian, there is a bona fide debate on 
whether true totalitarianism did not come to end there with Stalin’s death.3 
This leads, then, to the question of the nature of the “post-totalitarianism”4 
that followed it: a dictatorship caught in a morass of bureaucratic stagnation? 
With partial relics of totalitarian aims and methods? (But can there be such a 
thing as partial totalitarianism?) Especially during the Cold War years, there 
was also another, much simpler view of the countries of the “Soviet bloc”: they 
were, up to the end of communism in Europe in the 1990s, the epitome of 
totalitarian – as opposed to merely authoritarian – rule.5
These are the states study of whose private international law will be attempted 
here. Naturally, similar questions arise as to whether or not other states can be 
properly characterised as totalitarian.6
Totalitarianism is a complex phenomenon. One view is that of Friedrich 
and Brzezinski, for whom no less than six criteria have to be met for a society 
to be properly characterised as totalitarian: “an elaborate ideology, consisting 
2 The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, Schocken, 2004, p. 411 (see also ibid., note 12). The 
book was originally published in 1951; new editions have been published with amendments.
3 Supporting this view, Arendt (preceding note), pp. 389 and 403 (text written in 1967).
4 Iulia Motoc, “Law and Real Legitimacy in Eastern Communist Countries,” in Les doctrines in-
ternationalistes durant les années du communisme réel en Europe/Internationalist Doctrines During the 
Years of Real Communism in Europe (E. Jouannet and I. Motoc, eds.), 2012, p. 25.
5 E.g., during the 1960s, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, 2d ed., 1965 (paperback ed. 1966); Raymond Aron, Démocratie et totalitarisme, 1965. For 
the controversial view that “[o]nly intellectual fashion and the tyranny of Right/Left thinking prevent 
intelligent men of good will from perceiving the facts that traditional authoritarian governments are 
less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that 
they are more compatible with U.S. interests,” see “Dictatorship and Double Standards,” by Professor 
(as she then was) Jeane Kirkpatrick, Commentary, November 1979.
6 A list of examples (quite possibly both overinclusive and underinclusive) is suggested by Philippe 
Braud, Sociologie politique, 10th ed., 2011, p. 289 et sq.: Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia under Stalin, 
North Korea in (undefined) past times, China under Mao, Cambodia under Pol Pot, Iran under 
Khomeini and Afghanistan under the Taliban.
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of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man’s existence,” a 
mass party led by a dictator, a system of terror, a technologically conditioned 
near-complete monopoly of all means of mass communication and central 
bureaucratic control and direction of the economy.7 Others consider the ideo-
logical aspect as the decisive distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian 
states: the existence of a revolutionary state ideology, “the claim transformed 
into political action that the world and social life are changeable without lim-
it.”8 Whether or not the latter definition is sufficient for all purposes, it would 
appear to be very meaningful for the limited purpose of defining the distinctive 
features of law, and in particular private law, in totalitarian societies. Among 
the fundamental features of private law are the values and policies that a given 
society enforces among individuals through legal process, but also the degree 
of autonomy (or lack thereof) of the technical and systematic aspects of private 
law from the values or policies promoted by that society. A totalitarian state has 
unequivocal political aims and seeks transformation of every aspect of social 
life, of which law is a part; but with private international law, we have a branch 
of law which has traditionally prided itself on its abstraction and its intricate 
techniques, and which might perhaps have been able to resist, at least to some 
extent, contamination by the policies of a totalitarian regime.
2.   A brief look at Fascist Italy
That Mussolini’s Italy was, despite his valiant rhetorical efforts to the contrary, 
not a truly totalitarian state appears to be corroborated by its private interna-
tional law. The Italian conflict of laws rules were newly enacted in 1938, as a 
preliminary chapter of the new Civil Code which entered into force, as a whole, 
in 1942 – and could remain in force, without substantial legislative change, 
until their replacement by the Law on the Reform of Private International 
Law of 1995. The one change that was effected in 1944, after the fall of the 
fascist regime, was the suppression of a subsection to Article 31 of the Code 
which had specified that “[t]he corporative order is an integral part of public 
policy”; that was the one express reference to a fascist legal institution in the 
7 Op. cit., p. 22. It is doubtful, according to the authors (p. 22-23), whether administrative control 
of the courts is a distinctive trait as well.
8 Ibid., p. 16, quoting Hans Buchheim (with whom Friedrich and Brzezinski do not agree). See 
also Julien Freund, L’essence du politique, 1965, p. 298-299: “un gigantesque effort pour effacer la 
distinction entre l’individuel et le public, par élimination de cette réalité intermédiaire entre le public 
et le personnel qu’est la société civile,” and further on the essence of totalitarianism Gerhard Leibholz, 
Die Auflösung der liberalen Demokratie in Deutschland und das autoritäre Staatsbild, 1933, p. 68-69 (a 
short book published in Germany just before his emigration).
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Disposizioni sulla legge in generale pertaining to private international law in 
the Civil Code of 1942.9
The promoters of the 1938/1942 reform of Italian conflicts law clearly valued 
fidelity to classical doctrine rather than fascist posturing or ruthless pragma-
tism.10 The same seems to have been true of the case law of the Italian courts.11 
There was one area of the law, it is true, where the “corporatist” nature of the 
economy under fascism, the collective organisation of workers and employers 
under state supervision, did at least superficially play a significant role in Ital-
ian case law on private international law matters. This was the development 
of the protection of workers by overriding mandatory provisions of law, a 
question with which courts and authors were struggling in the 1930s in Italy 
and elsewhere.12 The Italian courts were the first to resolve this question by 
unambiguously stating that the protection of the provisions of Italian labour 
law was applicable to every worker habitually employed in Italy, whether by a 
foreign or an Italian employer and independently of the law normally applicable 
to the labour contract. This was justified by the idea that under the corporatist 
Charter of Labour, labour was no longer looked upon as a matter of private 
contract, but as an essential instrument of national power,13 and that “within 
the institutions built by the fascist state, the fundamental principle that labour 
has a social function has been realized to the fullest extent”.14
However, the “social function” of labour law, which translates itself into the 
protection of workers’ rights,15 can also be considered independently from a 
fascist organisation of the national economy. This explains that the Italian 
courts continued seamlessly, after the end of the fascist regime, to rely on the 
essential holdings of that jurisprudence, simply leaving aside the reference to 
9 A reference which was possibly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Corte di cassazione, see below 
text at notes 13 and 14. The subsection had been added in 1942, at the moment of the enactment 
of the Civil Code as a whole.
10 Paul Heinrich Neuhaus, “Das internationale Privatrecht im italienischen Zivilgesetzbuch von 
1942,” RabelsZ 1949/50, p. 22, 32.
11 One disclaimer applies here: the statement in the text is based not on an independent search of the 
law reports, but on the thorough review of Italian case law by Rodolfo De Nova, “La jurisprudence 
italienne en matière de conflits de lois de 1935 à 1949,” Rev. crit. 1950, p. 159 and p. 321.
12 See Henri Batiffol, Les conflits de lois en matière de contrats, 1938, pp. 262-273, for references (Italy : 
p. 269); or the homage to Italian case law at the time of the “institutions nouvelles” by the eminent 
(and decidedly right-wing) French conflicts lawyer Jean-Paulin Niboyet, Traité de droit international 
privé français, vol. V, 1948, p. 65, note 1.
13 Cass. 28 July 1934, Foro it. 1934, I, 1824.
14 Cass. 19 May 1939, Foro it. 1939, I, 1399.
15 Ibid. col. 1401, referring to “[l]a legislazione fascista che, ponendosi all’avanguardia dell’evoluzione 
mondiale nell’ordinamento di questa materia, ha realizzato con più vaste discipline, i più ampi diritti 
dei lavatori.”
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corporatism and fascism,16 as if that had been nothing more than yet another 
rhetorical device. Today, the solutions derived in the 1930s from the Charter of 
Labour appear as a wholly unexceptional part of the protection of the worker 
as the weaker party to the labour agreement.
3.   Conflicts law in National Socialist Germany17
National Socialism had a profound effect on German law, including private 
law,18 but there was to be no Nazi “conflicts revolution.”
a)   Legislation
A number of provisions on private international law were enacted after 1933, 
some of them on subjects unrelated to the National Socialist ideology,19 some 
of them as accompanying measures to decidedly Nazi laws. The notorious 
Blutschutzgesetz (“Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen 
Ehre” ) enacted in Nuremberg in 1935, which shocked the legal conscience of 
the world by forbidding marriage between “Aryans” and “non-Aryans,” con-
tained specific provisions on private international law. These, however, were not 
imperialistic, unilateral conflict rules.20 On the contrary, the conflicts provisions 
of the Blutschutzgesetz were more restrained than the usual conflict rules of 
16 See the cases from the post-war period cited by De Nova (note 11), p. 357.
17 This aspect of Nazi law has been the object of helpful studies by the Hamburg Max-Planck-Institute 
in the 1970s: see the doctoral dissertations by Rudolf Ulrich Külper, Die Gesetzgebung zum deutschen 
Internationalen Privatrecht im “Dritten Reich”, 1976 and Bernhard Raiser, Die Rechtsprechung zum 
deutschen internationalen Eherecht im “Dritten Reich”, 1980. Külper and Raiser had collaborated on the 
two volumes of documentation on case law from 1935 to 1944 published in 1980 in the IPRspr. series 
and comprising 832 cases, Die deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des internationalen Privatrechts 
in den Jahren 1935 bis 1944. A few of these cases have a specifically National Socialist content.
18 Michael Stolleis, Recht im Unrecht, 1994; Bernd Rüthers, Die unbegrenzte Auslegung, 6th edn., 
2005. On the “obliteration by political purposiveness” of the distinction between public and private 
law under National Socialism, see already Karl Loewenstein, “Law in the Third Reich,” 45 Yale L.J. 
779, 780 (1936).
19 The most important of these was the Verordnung des Ministerrats für die Reichsverteidigung of 7 
December 1942. Unrelated to Nazi ideology, but directly related to the German military operations 
and conquests during the Second World War, it provided for an exception to the reference to lex loci 
delicti in the case of torts among Germans abroad. It remained in force after the War (see commen-
tary by Karl Kreuzer in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, vol. 10, 3rd ed., 1998, 
p. 2011-2012) and is among the indirect predecessors of Art. 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation (No. 
864/2007) on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.
20 A fact on which much stress is laid in a cynical speech by Carl Schmitt to the German national 
branch of the International Law Association, published as “Die nationalsozialistische Gesetzgebung 
und der Vorbehalt des ‘ordre public’ im Internationalen Privatrecht,” ZAkdR 1936, p. 204 (see p. 
208: “wesentlich defensive[r] Charakter unserer Gesetzgebung,” or p. 211: “Die nationalsozialistische 
Gesetzgebung hat Sinn für Grenzen, auch für die eigenen Grenzen bewiesen, und daher auch Sinn 
für Gerechtigkeit”).
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German law: the law applied to the marriage of German “Aryans” only, and 
while it declared marriages void if they had been entered into in Germany in 
contravention of the law’s prohibitions, such marriages, if entered into abroad, 
were declared void only if the spouses had married abroad with fraudulent 
intent. Similarly, the eugenic marriage law of Germany (Ehegesundheitsgesetz of 
1935) specified that it did not apply if both spouses, or even only the husband, 
possessed a foreign nationality. The rationale behind this restraint was a matter 
of foreign policy: it did not seem expedient to create diplomatic incidents by 
applying the Blutschutzgesetz to marriages less closely linked to Germany.21 
Other – again foreign policy motivated – restrictions on the international 
operation of the Nazi racial laws were the effect not of legislation, but of the 
Nazi Maßnahmenstaat:22 when in 1943, during the war-time occupation of 
Alsace, the President of the District court in Strasbourg asked the Minister 
of Justice in Berlin for directives on how to handle claims for annulment of 
marriages between German or Alsatian women and their Arab husbands, the 
minister replied that “annulment by German courts of marriages to Arabs 
on ground of their race is for the moment considered undesirable for foreign 
policy reasons.”23
b)   Authors
Many German private international law scholars, subjected to persecution, left 
Germany.24 In-depth discussion of the novel private international law questions 
as arose out of National Socialism were left to new, ideologically reliable, men.25 
21 See Külper (note 17), p. 262. Similarly, there seems to have been a consensus not to apply the 
Blutschutzgesetz by renvoi in the case of the marriage of an “Aryan” foreigner, e.g. a Dane, whose 
national conflict rule would have referred back to German law as the law of the domicile (ibid., p. 
71).
22 This concept was developed by Ernst Fraenkel in his work The Dual State. A Contribution to the 
Theory of Dictatorship, 1940.
23 Külper, p. 262, quoting from archival material.
24 See the impressive series of biographies of emigrants to the United States in Ernst C. Stiefel and 
Frank Mecklenburg, Deutsche Juristen im amerikanischen Exil (1933-1950), 1991, and to England 
in Jurists Uprooted. German-speaking émigré lawyers in Twentieth Century Britain (Jack Beatson and 
Reinhard Zimmermann, eds.), 2004. See also Kurt Siehr, “German Jewish Scholars of Private Inter-
national Law and Comparative Law – Especially Ernst Frankenstein and His Research,” Mélanges 
Fritz Sturm, 1999, p. 1671; Kyle Graham, “The Refugee Jurist and American Law Schools,” 50 Am. 
J. Comp. L. 777 (2002).
25 The one established private international specialist remaining in Germany was Leo Raape (sign-
ing the first two editions of his Deutsches internationales Privatrecht as “Mitglied der Akademie für 
deutsches Recht”: 1st ed. 1938/1939, 2nd ed. 1945; four more editions after the War; but this very 
learned book, while containing a number of dispassionate references to the Blutschutzgesetz and to 
other concepts of the law of its time, is entirely free from Nazi jargon). In contrast, Wilhelm Wengler 
was a non-conformist, see Andreas Zimmermann, “Rechtswissenschaft in Zeiten von Diktatur und 
Demokratie am Beispiel Wilhelm Wengler,” Gedächtnisschrift für Jörn Eckert, 2008, p. 1005. 
181Private  International  Law  in  Totalitarian  States
Besides studying the conflict of laws provisions of new legislative enactments, in 
particular the Blutschutzgesetz,26 they had to address the most pressing question 
of private international law in National Socialist Germany: given the new and 
highly politicised orientation of German private law, in particular family law, 
was it still considered expedient to have that law apply to all persons of Ger-
man nationality and only to those? In light of the purpose of the substantive 
norms of family law, it might seem preferable to change the connecting factor 
from nationality to Volkszugehörigkeit, and to declare applicable the law of the 
völkisch27 community to which an individual belonged. Applied to German 
law, this would exclude certain individuals of German nationality who were 
considered alien to the German Volksgemeinschaft (in particular persons of 
Jewish or Slavonic descent), but it would include others who were, say, of Polish 
nationality but were considered as ethnically German, Volksdeutsche. For the 
writers who gave serious consideration to this substitution, it was clear that 
it corresponded best to the spirit of the new private law of Germany, but also 
that it raised obvious foreign policy concerns: it was bound to give rise to ob-
jections by the foreign states of whom a national – or many nationals – would 
be treated as Volksdeutsche and assimilated to Germans by German law. All 
the writers agreed, some of them with regret, that those concerns prevented 
a turning away from the nationality principle in international family law.28
A possible, albeit partial, solution to the dilemma of defining the appli-
cability of National Socialist private law lay not in redefining the conflict 
rules, but in defining rules of self-limitation as part of German substantive 
law. This would allow the link between Volkszugehörigkeit and the applica-
bility of German law to be set down while minimising the risk of offending 
foreign states. That was the approach of the Akademie für deutsches Recht in 
the preparation of a new Civil Code, the Volksgesetzbuch that was intended to 
replace the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch by a private law defined by new, völkisch 
concepts. The third part of the Fundamental Principles of that draft code 
was titled “Scope of application of the Volksgesetzbuch.” Within that part, 
26 See, among others, Maßfeller, “Das Reichsbürgergesetz und das Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen 
Blutes und der deutschen Ehre,“ JW 1935, p. 3417; George Löning, „Deutsches Rasseschutzgesetz 
und Internationales Privatrecht,“ ZAkdR 1936, p. 299 and the dissertation by Joachim Behn, Aus-
wirkungen der Rasseschutzgesetzgebung auf das zwischenstaatliche Recht, Greifswald, 1936.
27 In the parlance of the new German state, völkisch was a term permeated with National Socialist 
political romanticism. It cannot be adequately translated either as “national” or as “popular.” 
28 Horst Müller, “Gedanken zur Neugestaltung des Internationalen Privatrechts,” DJZ 1936, p. 
1067; Fritz Reu, Anwendung fremden Rechts. Eine Einführung, 1938, pp. 12-15 and “Zum Neubau 
des Internationalen Privatrechts,“ DR 1939, p. 228; see already Wolgast, “Nationalsozialismus und 
internationales Recht,“ a speech held in 1933 and published in DR 1934, p. 196, warning against 
the “Bismarckian” idea of excessive extension of the international applicability of German law.
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Principle 25 provided, substantially in conformity with orthodox conflicts 
principles, that “the Volksgesetzbuch applies to foreigners in conformity with 
the rules of interstate law recognised by the Großdeutsches Reich.” But a rule 
of self-limitation was formulated by Principle 24: for German nationals “of 
alien blood,” provisions “which according to their purpose are intended only 
for nationals of German blood do not apply.”29 But again, this was a provision 
of substantive law, not of private international law.
In 1942, the highest-ranking German government jurist, Professor Franz 
Schlegelberger, at the time provisional Reich Minister of Justice,30 published an 
article, “Wege und Ziele des deutschen internationalen, interterritorialen und 
interpersonalen Familienrechts” in the Zeitschrift für ausländisches und inter-
nationales Privatrecht. In this he explained that “after the war will have ended 
victoriously“, German jurists would be called upon as architects of the new legal 
order of Europe to define three areas of conflicts law: first, private international 
law rules, which would remain substantially unchanged; second, a temporary 
interlocal law as the German Reich’s expansion could not immediately lead 
to a uniform law; third and most importantly, a system of permanent rules of 
interpersonal law, not dissimilar to the rules of colonial law: every inhabitant 
of the Reich was to be governed by the law of his or her Volkszugehörigkeit, to 
be defined under the control of the German courts and, at a later stage, to be 
codified.31 Being predicated on a victorious war, Schlegelberger’s programme 
remained a Nazi fantasy.
c)   Cases 
Finally, there is the case law of the German courts. It has been demonstrated32 
that the private law jurisprudence of the era was not as apolitical as German 
jurists liked to describe it in the immediate post-war years, that change of the 
legal system in conformity with National Socialist ideas could and did hap-
pen through (re-)interpretation of pre-existing legal norms, and in particular 
that the value-laden “general clauses” of private law were easily reinterpreted 
29 “Das Volksgesetzbuch gilt für alle Angehörigen des Großdeutschen Reiches. Für Reichsangehörige 
artfremden Blutes gelten die Bestimmungen nicht, die nach ihrem Zweck nur für Reichsangehörige 
deutschen Blutes bestimmt sind”: Arbeitsberichte der Akademie für deutsches Recht, No. 22, 1942. A 
commentary explained that the members of the Academy had seen the issue of declaring the Volks-
gesetzbuch applicable to Volksdeutsche of foreign nationality, but had not wished to resolve this political 
question (“Doch muß diese Frage der politischen Zuständigkeit überlassen bleiben”: p. 46).
30 Schlegelberger was also to be the highest-ranking defendant at the so-called Justice (or Judges’) 
Trial in Nuremberg in 1947.
31 ZAIP 1942, in particular (for the interpersonal conflicts rules) pp. 12-17.
32 That demonstration is the subject of Rüthers’ habilitation thesis, cited above (note 18).
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in light of the values of the new regime. Some – but not all – of the private 
international cases decided during the Nazi era bear this out.
Should the applicability of German law be extended – without a basis in 
statutory conflicts law – to Volksdeutsche of foreign nationality? One lower 
court thought so and justified its position in outright propagandist terms,33 
but most courts disagreed.34 The Blutschutzgesetz was diligently applied, with 
a marked tendency to hold, as a matter of factual assessment, that a marriage 
contravening the law’s prohibitions and entered into abroad had been celebrat-
ed abroad with the intent to circumvent the law.35 More generally, it was not 
untypical for factual assessments to be used, in international cases as well as 
in internal ones, in an openly anti-Semitic manner.36
But the clearest incidence of the Nazi ideology in private international law 
jurisprudence was, predictably, its influence on the great “general clause” of 
conflicts law, the public policy exception.37 There it was held by the Reichsger-
icht that the prohibition of marriages among Christians and non-Christians 
(§ 64 of the Austrian ABGB) could not be considered contrary to public 
policy, especially “in consideration of the views ruling today’s Germany and 
expressed in particular in the Blutschutzgesetz,”38 or (by a court in Halle, but 
not by the Reichsgericht) that the “factual” marriages of Soviet Russia were the 
33 AG Bremen 3 September 1941, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 350: “Die Kindesmutter und der Kl. 
waren von je her Volksdeutsche, der Bekl. Reichsdeutscher. Die Kindesmutter und der Kl. besitzen, 
wie gesagt, seit November 1939 ebenfalls die deutsche Reichsangehörigkeit. Alle drei Beteiligten 
wohnen, nachdem das frühere Lodsch als Litzmannstadt Bestandteil des Großdeutschen Reiches 
geworden ist, auf deutschem Boden. Unter diesen Umständen würde es deutschem Rechtsempfinden 
geradezu ins Gesicht schlagen, wenn man im vorliegenden Falle polnisches Recht, d.h. das Recht eines 
untergegangenen Staates, noch dazu eines Staates, der von je her das Deutschtum auf das schärfste 
bekämpft hat, anwenden wollte“.
34 OLG Naumburg 20 April 1937, confirmed by RG 18 November 1937, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 
181 (both judgments are, apart from the holding of the OLG on private international law, racially 
inspired); cf. the reasoning of OLG Hamburg 26 February 1942, ibid., No. 19, which is both very 
völkisch and nonetheless orthodox from a conflict of laws perspective.
35 KG 11 October 1937, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 15; RG 5 December 1940, ibid., No. 201; RG 5 
November 1942, ibid., No. 20.
36 A grotesque example is KG 31 March 1941, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 601, in the assessment of 
the domicile of an emigrated Jew: “Bei einer Auswanderung von Juden aus Deutschland nach London 
kann nicht ohne weiteres angenommen werden, daß sie dort einen so festen Wohnsitz begründen 
wollten, wie es das englische Recht als Voraussetzung für das domicile of choice fordert. Denn er-
fahrungsgemäß war London oder Paris für diese Leute der zunächst aufgesuchte Ort, um von hier 
aus weiter ihre Netze auszuwerfen und sich dann dorthin zu begeben, wo ihnen die leichtesten und 
bequemsten Verdienstmöglichkeiten winkten.”
37 This had been predicted by Wolgast (note 28) in his 1933 speech: DR 1934, p. 200. See also OLG 
Hamburg 26 February 1942, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 19, which defines public policy in völkisch 
terms.
38 RG 10 October 1935, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 11. The holding on public policy is substantially 
in line with an earlier case of the Court from Weimar times: RG 16 May 1931, RGZ 132, 146.
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product of a “Jewish-Bolshevik” spirit repugnant to German public policy.39 
Since Nazism was, in economic terms, a communitarian ideology, a number 
of decisions also held – less objectionably in terms of the substance of their 
holding, but with reference to National Socialist rhetoric – that it was for 
völkisch reasons that certain concepts of the German law of contract were 
to be seen as resistant, on public policy grounds, to the less socially inspired 
concepts of foreign contract laws.40
4.   Soviet private international law
This section will attempt to look at the law of the USSR. It does not have pre-
tensions at scientific precision, nor does the author pretend to know Russian; 
it was necessary therefore to rely on such translations of treatises on private 
international law into Western languages as were published during the Soviet 
years41 and on secondary sources. Unfortunately, there seem to have been no 
full translations of books before the end of the 1950s, so that the Stalinist 
period in particular will remain in a kind of (at least metaphorically befitting) 
semi-darkness.42
A first characteristic not necessarily of “Soviet private international law,” 
but certainly of the Soviet text books, is this: a tendency to cite as authority 
purely political statements by Lenin or Stalin, later by Khrushchev or by var-
ious Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. None of these 
had any kind of legal content; they express general policies or contain general 
statements about the relationship between the Soviet Union and bourgeois 
states, in terms stressing the international dimensions of class struggle, or (in 
later years) peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between socialism 
39 LG Halle 7 December 1935, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 172. But see on the same subject RG 7 
April 1938, ibid., No. 189, a very learned judgment.
40 OLG Munich 2 February 1938, IPRspr. 1935-1944, No. 56; OLG Danzig 13 June 1942, IPRspr. 
1935-1944, No. 650.
41 The first treatise to be thus published (in a German translation published by VEB Deutscher 
Zentralverlag in East Berlin) is L.A. Lunz’ valuable Internationales Privatrecht (vol. I, 1961; vol. II, 
1964). Further: I.S. Pereterski and S.B. Krylov, Lehrbuch des internationalen Privatrechts, 1962; M.M. 
Boguslavkii, Private International Law: The Soviet Approach, 1988.
42 For that period, a few secondary sources published in the West are all that could be used for this 
essay. They do not paint a uniform picture. For instance, there was a first edition of Lunz’ textbook 
published in Russian in 1949, at the height of post-war Stalinism: was it a book throwing “some 
interesting light, mostly on the negative side, on conflict of laws from the Russian viewpoint” (A.K.R. 
Kiralfy, “A Soviet Approach to Private International Law” (1951) 4 Int. L.Q. 120), “an unusual 
mixture of political propaganda and genuine learning” (Alfred Drucker, “Soviet Views on Private 
International Law” (1955) 4 I.C.L.Q. 884, 887), or rather an “ouvrage bien connu” similar to the 
later edition (supra, preceding footnote) published under Khrushchev (Henri Batiffol, book review, 
Rev. crit. 1964, p. 838)? 
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and capitalism. It does seem clear that the choice of an author, writing under 
the conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union, to rely on policy statements of 
this kind is more likely to result from caution than from a deeply seated ideo-
logical commitment to the aims pursued by the Central Committee.43 There 
is a profound difference between the Soviet writers on private international 
law and, say, a Vyschinsky.44
A second characteristic, which sets Soviet private international law apart from 
most modern conceptions of private international law in the West, is the tendency 
to stress its link to public international law concepts. This, it is true, was an area 
of relative pluralism in legal doctrine in the Soviet Union, with certain authors 
(in particular public international lawyers like Krylov) defending the idea that 
private international law is governed by public international law principles and 
others considering it as belonging to private law.45 But at any rate the practice 
of the Soviet Union emphasised the importance of considerations of reciprocity, 
even of retortion where needed and showed that considerations of foreign affairs 
were not considered alien to the treatment of private international law matters.46 
What was of special importance was to secure equality of treatment of socialist 
property with capitalist property by the recognition abroad of nationalisations 
and of the legal capacity of socialist enterprises.
Third, there was the tendency in Soviet private international law to apply 
the lex fori and not the national law or the law of the domicile to many aspects 
of the personal status of foreigners in the Soviet Union – their marriage, di-
vorce or filiation –, a tendency frequently criticised, in the 1930s and 1940s, 
by Western conflicts specialists and said to be a side effect of communism. 
In fact, while a tendency to favour application of the lex fori may indeed 
correspond in theory to totalitarian thinking, it would be wrong to consider 
that specific feature of Soviet private international law in the family law field 
43 A psychological factor totally overlooked by F.A. Mann in a Cold-War-inspired review of the 
translation of the textbook by Lunz (note 41), (1962) 11 I.C.L.Q. 305. Other reviewers had more 
of a sense of mercy or humour and recognised the value of the book despite its occasional rhetoric: 
Hans Baade, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 464 (1962), Albert Ehrenzweig, 57 A.J.I.L. 685 (1963) or Henri 
Batiffol, Rev. crit. 1964, p. 838 (see also his reviews of later works by Lunz, whom he obviously held 
in high regard: Rev. crit. 1974, p. 868; 1976, p. 254; 1977, p. 443.).
44 Cf. Andrei Vyschinsky (ed.), The Law of the Soviet State, 1948 (English transl., N.Y., Macmillan).
45 See the various authors cited by Pereterski and Krylov (note 41), pp. 3-4.
46 Lunz, in particular vol. I, pp. 26-27 and 240-241; vol. II, pp. 16-19 (stressing that retortion 
cannot concern the operation of conflict rules as such, and that it is a matter not for the courts, but 
for the government); see also, by a distinguished Hungarian author, the description of the principles 
of the “new socialist private international law” based on the Soviet doctrines: Stephen Szászy, “Private 
International Law in Socialist Countries,” Recueil des cours, vol. 127 (1969), p. 178-179. It may be 
thought that relics of the Soviet emphasis on reciprocity remain in Russian private international law 
to this day.
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as typically totalitarian; if that were the case, the same totalitarian features 
would be present in many national, including Western, conflict of laws rules 
and codifications.47 Another argument to the contrary lay in the fact that the 
lex-forism of the international family law of the Soviet Union was by no means 
systematically imitated by the other states of the Eastern bloc: it was not, for 
instance, a feature of Czechoslovak or Hungarian private international law,48 
or of the conflict rules of East Germany.49
Fourth and perhaps most characteristically, the traditional concepts of private 
international law were maintained, with very few originalities as compared to 
Western conflicts thinking. Even the structure of the public policy exception 
was entirely in conformity with traditional thinking; what was original was 
the content of Soviet public policy. This is well illustrated by an extract from 
one the first treatises on Soviet private international law, published by I.S. 
Pereterski in 1925:50 “By virtue of the public policy of the RSFSR, the appli-
cation of foreign law cannot be authorised if it results in the weakening of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, in the violation of the economic system of the 
RSFSR, in the exploitation of man by man, or where the foreign law is based on 
inequality of races or nationalities, or on considerations of religion, and where 
the foreign law creates rights in contradiction with their social and economic 
purpose.” The application of such foreign laws was, in Pereterski’s opinion, a 
counter-revolutionary act punishable in accordance with the Criminal Code.
In a retrospective account of conflict of laws rules in the former socialist 
states of Europe, Petar Šarčević writes that “[d]espite the powerful influence 
of politics and ideology on all spheres of life, conflicts scholars were under 
considerably less ideological pressure than their colleagues in other fields of 
law,” and that “the modernization of [the post-war conflict laws of the socialist 
states] was up to the standards of the time they were drafted. Although their 
goal was ideological, the codes were free of ideology.”51
47 Cf. Lunz, vol. I, p. 144, citing in particular American private international law.
48 Lunz, vol. II, p. 210 explains that both the Soviet “territorialist” approach – also followed in 
Bulgaria – and the traditional approach as followed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary can lead to 
equivalent results for citizens of bourgeois states; courts in the socialist states using nationality as a 
connecting factor simply had to resort frequently to public policy to displace “typical elements of 
bourgeois family law” such as racial or religious impediments to marriage and inequality of men and 
women in the effects of marriage.
49 §§ 18, 20 or 22 Rechtsanwendungsgesetz of 5 December 1975. However § 20(1), second sentence 
did provide for application of the law of the GDR to all divorces of couples of mixed nationality.
50 The extract is quoted by Arsène Stoupnitsky, article “Droit international privé soviétique” in 
Lapradelle and Niboyet’s Répertoire de droit international, vol. VII (1930), p. 111.
51 “Die Modernisierung des Internationalen Privatrechts in der Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” 
in Perspektiven des Internationalen Privatrechts nach dem Ende der Spaltung Europas (C. von Bar, ed.), 
1993, pp. 14 and 25.
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5.   Conclusion
Review of the private international law of three now-defunct totalitarian, 
quasi-totalitarian or post-totalitarian European regimes shows two things.
The nature of the societies under totalitarian rule did have an influence even 
on private international law: the racial and eugenic laws of National Socialist 
Germany contained provisions on their international efficiency, and the spirit 
of the racial laws was perceptible in much of the private international law cases 
involving Jews. There were some incidences of the Nazi Maßnahmenstaat in 
Germany; an emphasis on reciprocity and the possibility of retortion in the 
Soviet Union; in both states a redefinition of the substantive content of public 
policy; and much rhetoric. All in all though, it is the survival of the techniques 
of private international law in these states that is striking. These techniques 
were not abolished, nor did they end up being replaced, in any one of the 
regimes, by systematic application of the lex fori, by conflict rules using as 
connecting factors völkisch or racial characteristics in Nazi Germany, or more 
simply by arbitrariness. The civilising value of private international law could 
not be totally suppressed, even in totalitarian states.


